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The French comedian Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala has caused controversy in France over the alleged anti-
Semitism of his performances. Paul A. Silverstein writes on the wider issues related to anti-
Semitism in French society, and why Dieudonné has proved so controversial. He argues that while
Dieudonné’s supporters deny the accusations of anti-Semitism, they feed into a broader social and
institutional context that can make Jewish citizens feel targeted. There is also a danger that in
attacking Dieudonné, the French establishment risks demonising other French minority groups who
make up many of his supporters.
On December 28, 2013, upon scoring his first goal for his new football club West Bromwich Albion,
the veteran French striker Nicolas Anelka ran across the field with his right arm extended by his side and his left
hand touching his shoulder. Completely unremarkable by the flamboyant standards of goal celebrations in
professional football, the gesture touched a raw nerve in France where the match was being televised live, with
viewers immediately identifying it with the quenelle developed by controversial shock comic Dieudonné M’Bala
M’Bala, who has repeatedly been accused (and on several occasions found guilty) of propagating racial hatred,
particularly against Jews.
For over the last decade, a moral panic has arisen in
France over the rise of a “new anti-Semitism” feared to
propagate among the under-employed multi-racial youth
precariat inhabiting council estates (les cités) along the
French urban periphery where many of Dieudonné’s
most ardent fans reside. The “new anti-Semitism” is also
seen as being underwritten by far left anti-globalisation
platforms that are highly critical of American imperialism
and decidedly sympathetic to the Palestinian struggle.
Outside of his comic performances, Dieudonné has
been directly engaged in these latter causes, running
political campaigns on first an anti-racist, then an anti-
globalisation, and most recently an anti-Zionist platform.
This has led to him ultimately collaborating with far right
activists like Front National founder Jean-Marie Le Pen,
Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson, and polemicist Alain
Soral — associations that have led a number of
Dieudonné’s former political allies on the far left, and
even his former performance partner, the Jewish comedian Élie Semoun, to definitively break with him. Given such a
trajectory, Dieudonné, like the quenelle itself, has had a polarising effect on an already tense French public debate
over free speech and the limits of toleration.
Anti-Semitism in France
The question of an evolving anti-Semitism in France has received increased attention over the past decade by
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scholars, activists, human rights organisations, politicians, and the popular press. If the vast majority of those
surveyed in opinion polls disavow any hatred of Jews, the Interior Ministry has reported periodic spikes of up to
nearly 1,000 yearly threats or acts of anti-Semitic violence against persons and property across the last decade,
generally followed by equally precipitous dips.
To a certain extent, these statistics reflect new reporting guidelines that came into effect during this period, as well
as new laws increasing the criminal sanctions for those found guilty. Likewise, they parallel an even more
pronounced and consistent increase in anti-Islamic attitudes and anti-Arab and anti-Muslim acts affecting
marginalised groups that do not benefit from the same juridical oversight and protections.
Nonetheless, a number of high-profile cases — including the 2006 kidnapping and murder of Jewish cell phone
salesman Ilan Halimi by a multi-ethnic group of youths from the Paris cités led by Youssouf Fofana, and the 2012
attack on a Toulouse Jewish day school by Mohamed Merah – have fostered for many French Jews a sense of
being embattled, have spurred waves of new emigration to Israel, and have even encouraged occasional vigilante
reprisals by extremist Zionist groups like the Ligue de Défense Juive (Jewish Defense League).
While scholars have pointed to the fragmented nature of anti-Semitism and the heterogeneity of perpetrators –
including a still-active neo-Nazi movement – media pundits have linked it directly to the multi-racial, impoverished
urban periphery described by educator Emmanuel Brenner as “the lost territories of the Republic” and by
philosopher Alain Finkielkraut as “savage lands” ( lieux féroces), where an “ethnicization of social relations” (in the
words of sociologist Michel Wieviorka) coexists with anti-American and anti-Israel political commitments, particularly
among young-Muslim French citizens with leftist leanings.
Increasingly, as feminist philosopher Wendy Brown has maintained, anti-Semitism, alongside homophobic and
patriarchal ideologies, are taken to be unacceptable cultural attitudes which delegitimise foreigner (and especially
Muslim) belonging in liberal polities. Such abject practices define the limits of Republican toleration, as policed
through integration contracts for new immigrants, the ban on public veiling, and the criminalisation of Holocaust
denial.
There is of course something deeply ironic about ideologically linking the fate of the French Republic to the
elimination of anti-Semitism. As historian Esther Benbassa has underlined, Jewish citizenship in France came at the
price of disavowing religious community institutions and embarking on a fraught path of cultural and social
assimilation. The Dreyfus Affair  and the Vichy government’s complicity in the Holocaust only underlined the
uncertainty of this incorporation and the tenuousness of French Jewish citizenship more generally.
Given this history, many French Jews have aspirationally tethered their cultural belonging to a post-Revolutionary
Republican ideology of civility, solidarity, and state secularism (laïcité). Jews, as a group, make a double ethical
claim on France, both as moral censors to whom an unpayable debt is owed, and as potential victims of ongoing
global hatred deserving of special protections. As Wendy Brown argues, “Jews emerge as the ultimate champions
and foot-soldiers of tolerance by virtue of their need for it.”
Hence contemporary anxieties around what some Jewish groups perceive to be the banalisation of the Shoah in
public discourse, or around the global left’s instrumentalisation of Palestinians as the poster-child victims of Israeli-
cum-imperialist aggression – both of which Jewish watchdog organisations decry as ultimately anti-Semitic. Jewish
suffering continues to be articulated as unique and incommensurable even as most French Jews present
themselves as undifferentiated citizens of, and even spokespeople for, the Republic.
The Dieudonné effect
Dieudonné’s linked comedic and political engagements play precisely on such ambivalences of belonging, traumas
of toleration, and narcissisms of victimhood. In his long-term efforts to raise public awareness about France’s past
participation in the African slave trade and its contribution to contemporary white privilege, Dieudonné condemns
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what he takes to be a double standard in the recognition and indemnification of past suffering, as well as the
hypocrisy in the French state’s vigilance against anti-Semitism while allowing other forms of institutionalised racism
to propagate.
Moreover, he directly links Jewish privilege to black suffering, both in terms of his claims about the historical role of
Jewish financiers in the slave economy, and with regards to what he decries as the contemporary racism of the
“Jewish lobby” (iconised by one of his Jewish characters parodying a Nazi salute and shouting “Isra-heil!”). In the
absence of such state protections for other French minority groups, Dieudonné presents himself as what Wieviorka
terms a “moral entrepreneur,” calling forth popular resistance to the “békés and bankers” who he claims control the
political and economic “system.”
In his comedy sketches, Dieudonné draws on the French comic legacy of Pierre Desproges and Coluche (and
indeed the Americans Lenny Bruce and Richard Pryor) who sparked controversy through their rejection of
respectable discourse to call out ethnic and racial prejudices. Dieudonné arguably takes this strategy a step further,
courting controversy with his public calls for the liberation of Youssouf Fofana or by sharing the stage with
unapologetic Holocaust deniers, and then incorporating the resulting accusations of anti-Semitism directly into his
sketches as a meta-critique of French hypocrisies of tolerance.
By presenting the accusations as a selective regulation of free speech, he implicitly questions the privilege of those
who determine the bounds of liberal toleration. Journalist Sylvain Cypel recently likened the quenelle to the
repressed Nazi salute performed by Peter Sellers in Stanley Kubrick’s satirical film Dr. Strangelove, and one might
indeed interpret Dieudonné’s gesture as a commentary on repression and mandatory self-regulation. Dieudonné
and most of his fans vehemently deny that the quenelle has anything whatsoever to do with a Nazi salute, but like
his comedic performances, the quenelle precisely plays on the slipperiness of meaning, the polysemy of signs, and
the ambiguous relations between verbal, facial, and gestural expression.
Therein arguably lies the brilliance of Dieudonné’s
comedy, where lines between performer and character
are multi-layered and blurred, and where the racialised
irreverence dares the spectator to take seriously that
which is presented in the frame of satire. Who are the
real racists, it seems to ask us: those who play with
popular stereotypes or those who can only see race and
racism in the play?
The uncomfortable frisson of having one’s liberal moral
commitments laid bare clearly drives part of the mass
appeal of Dieudonné’s performance art, as does the
blatant populism of the comedian speaking directly to
those who feel “taken up the arse” by the political and
economic establishment — a sentiment that the
quenelle (translated colloquially as a “suppository”)
graphically illustrates. For a comedian who has utterly
polarised the French public sphere, inciting either condemnations or defenses with little room (as Swiss-Muslim
intellectual Tariq Ramadan has bemoaned) for nuanced critique, Dieudonné’s shows, gatherings, and online
performances gather together an incredibly heterogeneous audience from across the French racial, ethnic, class,
and ideological spectrum – a veritable counter-public that arguably better represents contemporary, quotidian
France than the public intellectuals who participate in television talk shows and parliamentary debates.
While the Muslim-French cité residents, neo-Nazi punks, and even French soldiers who have all posted online
quenelle performances may not agree on much, they share a general belief in the existence of a hopelessly sclerotic
“system” in which they see little personal future, and thus find in Dieudonné’s comedy, and even his satirical
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electoral campaigns, a welcome attempt to figuratively upend it. That such postcolonial populism, as anthropologist
Jean-Loup Amselle and other commentators have bemoaned, seems to instrumentalise anti-Semitic prejudice as a
rallying point is surely deplorable. It is also highly doubtful that the counter-public called forth by Dieudonné’s multi-
media act equally upholds the broader anti-racist ethical critique the comedian avows to profess.
Dieudonné and his fans may repeatedly insist that they are not “anti-Semites”, and that they do not harbour any
particular hatred for Jews, but in doing so they misrecognise anti-Semitism as an individual mental state rather than
as a set of social effects, historical practices, and institutional forms that give it an undeniable reality even for those
who in other regards benefit from relative political and economic privilege. Satire may provide plausible deniability
for those within its arena, but it does not eliminate the sting for those who understandably feel targeted by it.
Lamentable as well is the instrumentalisation of the Dieudonné affair by the French political establishment who have
once again sought to displace the burden of public civility on French minorities. In the wake of the Anelka quenelle
celebration and responding to a public outcry particularly from French-Jewish advocacy groups, French Interior
Minister and presidential hopeful Manuel Valls moved to legally block Dieudonné from staging his show, Le Mur [The
Wall], as a risk to “public order” and in which the representation of Jewish characters was adjudged by the French
high court to challenge “human dignity.”
The appeal to humanitarian principles struck many as particularly ironic coming from a public figure who had gained
notoriety and bipartisan political capital for his support for immigration quotas, calling for the deportation of Roma,
and being caught on tape deploring the lack of white residents in suburban Evry. The demonisation of Anelka and
other French sporting figures — including fellow Muslim-French footballers Samir Nasri and Mamadou Sakho —
who have posed with Dieudonné performing quenelles reiterates a long-standing demand that celebrities from
minority groups serve as representatives of multicultural quiescence.
Much like the public debate following Zinedine Zidane’s infamous 2006 head-butt, the quenelle affair risks bolstering
an increasingly popular view that the French Republic is under threat from internal incivility, from an increasingly
fragmented population that refuses to sign an already-written contract of liberal toleration. And that is probably the
last lesson one might hope would be drawn from the comedian’s efforts, problematic as they may be, to insist on the
inclusion of a broader population into national narratives of suffering and belonging.
*The term ‘béké’ refers to French colonial settlers of the Antilles and their descendants, but Dieudonné deploys it as
a general term for white privilege built on the back of ongoing black enslavement.
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